Update on the Portfolio Management case study

Here is a quick update on the portfolio management case study: The actual cost of Kin failure, resulting (in my opinion) primarily from a failure to effectively manage a portfolio competing/complimentary of R&D projects to Microsoft is $700M+.  Check out posts on Portfolio Management on some processes, tools and learnings on how to avoid portfolio management errors.

Via Engadget: “Here’s a tidbit in today’s Microsoft quarterly earnings that we previously overlooked: a $240 million cost of revenue ‘primarily… resulting from the discontinuation of the Kin phone, offset in part by decreased Xbox 360 console costs.’ In other words, the company took at least a quarter billion hit due to manufacturing, distribution, and support costs of the Kin (according to Microsoft’s definition of ‘cost of revenue’). We don’t know how much Xbox 360 offset, unfortunately, but we can add this figure to the $500 million Danger acquisition and the full marketing cost for the product (which we also don’t know, but anecdotally, it was on par with other major campaigns) to reach… well, at least $800 million in regret for the folks in Redmond.”


Optimizing Product Development

The paper Balancing Development Costs and Sales to Optimize the Development Time of Product Line Additions in Journal of Product Innovation Management has some very interesting data for all R&D managers.  It has attempted to quantify and test gut feel R&D portfolio managers use in deciding on how to fund development projects – the results might surprise you.

Development teams often use mental models to simplify development time decision making because a comprehensive empirical assessment of the trade-offs across the metrics of development time, development costs, proficiency in market-entry timing, and new product sales is simply not feasible. Surprisingly, these mental models have not been studied in prior research on the trade-offs among the aforementioned metrics. These mental models are important to consider, however, because they define reality, specify what team members attend to, and guide their decision making.

Clearly, problem facing portfolio mangers is rather large – to balance between schedule, costs, market timing and sales (amongst other objectives).  There are no easy approaches to do this quantitatively and managers have to depend on their intuition.  However, the paper’s analysis shows that there is a significant cost to this simplification.  The analysis is based on a significant dataset (albeit one that might have some geographical / cultural bias as it is all from Netherlands).

This survey-based study uses data from 115 completed NPD projects, all product line additions from manufacturers in The Netherlands, to demonstrate that there is a cost to simplifying decision making. Making development time decisions without taking into account the contingency between development time and proficiency in market-entry timing can be misleading, and using either a sales-maximization or a cost-minimization simplified decision-making model may result in a cost penalty or a sales loss.

The results are surprising, but intuitive.  Instead of maximizing just one dimension, optimal results are obtained when a balance is achieved between several competing objectives:

The results from this study show that the development time that maximizes new product profitability is longer than the time that maximizes new product sales and is shorter than the development time that minimizes development costs.

If one is forced lean towards something, development acceleration to maximize sales with associated increased development costs is better than minimizing development costs by extending the schedule.

Furthermore, the results reveal that the cost penalty of sales maximization is smaller than the sales loss of development costs minimization. An important implication of the results is that, to determine the optimal development time, teams need to distinguish between cost and sales effects of development time reductions.

 I have a feeling that this result may have may have other underlying causes like extending development schedule to reduce costs might demoralize teams or increase defects…


R&D Portfolio Management case study – Microsoft Kin

It is not very  often do we get a look inside R&D management processes and tools at giants like Microsoft and Toyota. So, it is good to learn as much as we can when information becomes available.  I am studying new public disclosures on Toyota’s R&D process and will post about it soon.  The topic of interest today is Microsoft and its killing of Kin product line with only 10k units sold.  This was a big failure – the acquisition of Danger alone is reported to have been around $500M, which does not include the cost of developing the product line and associated software. Lets start off with a quick background from a great article in Ars Technica:

Microsoft’s ambitions with the KIN were sound. As much as the iPhone and, lately, Android handsets garner all the press attention, smartphones represent only a minority of phone sales—a growing minority, but a minority all the same. There are many, many people who don’t have a smartphone, and don’t even particularly want one, and they easily outnumber smartphone users.

Redmond wanted to be a part of this broader market. The company was already a big player in the smartphone market with Windows Mobile; the KIN was a product of its ambitions beyond that space. So rather than starting from scratch, in 2008 Microsoft bought Danger, the company behind the T-Mobile Sidekick line.

To a certain extent Microsoft succeeded in this new device.  Clearly they had great start from Danger and their cloud computing platform.  The idea of social networking focused phone for tweens was also great.  As the AnandTech article points out the phone did have some very good features:

KIN included a notable number of features Microsoft and its Danger team executed better than anyone else in the smartphone market today.

Amongst the notable features are innovative form factor, good usability, great battery life and aforementioned social media integration and very innovative packaging.  So why did Kin fail?  I guess the problems are related to a broad failure of R&D management processes:

  1. Portfolio Management: Executive sponsorship critical to R&D project funding
  2. Acquisition Integration: Not invented here
  3. Product Management: Positioning product as alternate to smart phones but the same cost
  4. Project Management: Significant development delays
  5. Overall R&D management: Unclear strategy, ambiguous goals 

Lets look at each one of these factors in detail:

Several posts such a Engadget and Mini-Microsoft have pointed out that Executive sponsorship is a critical part of Microsoft’s R&D portfolio management.  The Project Pink (which later became Kin) was sponsored by J. Allard, while Andy Lees sponsored a somewhat competing project of Windows Phone 7.  It is a bit strange to prioritize product portfolios based on executive sponsorship and leads to significant problems.  From engadget:

To get anywhere, a project inside Microsoft needs an executive sponsor, and for Pink, Allard had been that guy from day one. It was his baby. Of course, Allard was a visionary, an idea man; Lees — like most Microsoft execs — is a no-nonsense numbers guy, and to put it bluntly, he didn’t like that Pink existed. To quote our sources, Lees was “jealous,” and he was likely concerned that Kin was pulling mindshare (and presumably resources) from Windows Mobile’s roadmap. With enough pressure, Lees ended up getting his way; Pink fell under his charge and Allard was forced into the background

Having two competing priorities is not uncommon in R&D portfolios.  However, alignment of priorities and project pipeline gets done well in advance of launch (at early stages and continuously during portfolio reviews) in most companies with effective portfolio management processes.  In case of Microsoft however, the two projects ended being misaligned strategically, along market niches and through release schedule.  Apparently, Lees, the executive in-charge of Windows Phone 7 ended up re-aligning scopes only partially – which hurt overall results:

Having Lees in control changed everything, if for no other reason than he didn’t care about the project at all. This was right around the time that Windows Phone 7 was rebooting, and Pink didn’t fit in his game plan; to him, it was little more than a contractual obligation to Verizon, a delivery deadline that needed to be met. Pink — Allard’s vision of it, anyhow — was re-scoped, retooled, and forced onto a more standardized core that better fit in with the Windows Phone roadmap, which in turn pushed back the release date. Ironically, because they had to branch off so early, Kin would ultimately end up with an operating system that shares very little with the release version of Windows Phone 7 anyway.

Having acquired technology integrated into new products is not uncommon either.  However, there did not seem to be adequate integration of Danger into Microsoft.  The rejection of acquired technology from Danger and the move to enforce Windows Phone 7 structure on to a completely different OS ended up delaying the project by more than 18 months:

This move allegedly set the release of the devices back 18 months, during which time Redmond’s carrier partner became increasingly frustrated with the delays.

Since Windows Phone 7 is a smart phone OS and requires associated expensive hardware, this added to costs of the phone. Such a big delay in launch of the device soured relationship with the launch partner Verizon and reduced their appetite to subsidize the phone and service.

Apparently when it came time to actually bring the Kins to market, Big Red had soured on the deal altogether and was no longer planning to offer the bargain-basement pricing deals it first had tendered. The rest, as they say, is history — though we don’t think even great prices could have accounted for what was fundamentally a flawed product. Our source says that the fallout from this troubled partnership is that Microsoft has backed away from Verizon as a Windows Phone 7 launch partner, claiming that the first handsets you see won’t be offered on the CDMA carrier — rather that we should expect GSM partners to get first crack.

Product management processes ensure that product is aligned with the target market – in terms of price, functionality and usability.  Due to portfolio management failures, product management failed as well:

Some suggest that the KIN really failed because teenagers all want iPhones. There’s certainly some truth in that—iPhones are certainly aspirational goods—but iPhones are expensive. The comparison is made because the KIN was fundamentally priced like an iPhone—but it was never meant to be. Had it been priced like a Sidekick, as it should have been, and as Verizon initially set out to do, it would have substantially undercut the iPhone and been a better fit for the Facebook generation to boot. It wouldn’t do everything the iPhone could do, but it wouldn’t be operating in the same market anyway.

Furthermore, the schedule slips led to a very incomplete feature set that did not include a calender, instant messaging etc.:

That brings me to what else was lacking that was rather glaring – a calendar. With the right execution, the KIN could have perfectly integrated the Facebook event calendar, invitations, and exchange or Google calendars. Instead, the KIN has absolutely no planning tools or event notifications.

Nor was the data plan priced for the target market:

For starters, the devices lacked a realistic pricing structure – despite not quite being a smartphone, Verizon priced the data plans for the KIN as if they were, at $29.99 per month. There’s since been discussion that Verizon originally intended heavily reduced pricing for the KINs, but soured on the deal when Microsoft delayed release. At the right price, the KINs could have been a compelling alternative to the dying breed of featurephones. It’s hard to argue that there isn’t a niche that the KIN could have filled at the bottom, yet above boring featurephones. At $10 per month or less for data, the KIN would’ve been a much more successful sell.

Add to this mix strategic direction problems: First Microsoft could not get itself to support competitive social networking sites such as Flickr – which actually reduced the value of the product

The giants of the social networking space include Facebook and Twitter, for which Kin offered at least fair support. But rather than support Flickr for images and (Google-owned) YouTube for video, Microsoft plugged in its Windows Live services for these media. Kin also lacked established functionality such as a calendar and instant messaging as well as support for fast-growing services embraced by social networkers such as Foursquare.

Also attempting multiple very conflicting goals (compete with iPhone and be cheap like sidekick) led to muddled execution:

The heart of both Microsoft’s and Google’s mobile operating system strategy is to have diverse handsets running its software. Still, both companies look at the level of integration Apple can achieve with the iPhone and are drawn to have a heavier hand in the design of handsets. This sort of licensor regret is part of what drove Google to create the Nexus One and likely also contributed to Microsoft’s decision to create the Kin handsets. 

It appears that in absence of clear portfolio goals and metrics, there is a lot of politics – which further reduces efficiency and efficacy, drives morale down and leads to rumors of layoff:

But wait, there’s more — the Kin team is being refocused onto the WP7 project, but that’s not the only shakeup going on. Our source said there had been rumblings that Steven Sinofsky — president of the Windows and Windows Live groups — is making a play for the entire mobile division as well in an attempt to bring a unified, Windows-centric product line to market.

I hope you are with me: portfolio management problems along with acquisition challenges problems led to project management problems and resulted in very large schedule slips. Those schedule slips along with feature creep and problems with product management.  Unclear strategic direction and management in-infighting tied everything together and ensured that the project failed.

Many lessons to be learned here!  What do you think?


Customer Driven R&D

It is interesting how R&D managers have to navigate the complex world of management advice – I guess thats what makes it interesting. The article Avoid The Commoditization Trap from Forbes recommends customer driven R&D:

To do that, gather together the best minds in your business, including representatives of all the company’s critical functions, and ask them the following question: ‘Knowing what we all know, if you were our customers, how would you go about deciding whether to purchase our products or services?’ Your cross-functional and top-performing team should then make a list of all of the questions that arise about the problems to be solved for your customers and the questions those customers should be asking a potential solution provider. If those questions are positioned correctly, you’ll be able to expand your customers’ awareness of how you can address their needs, increase your credibility and ultimately set yourself further apart from your competition.

This is actually the opposite of the University of Illinois study recommending focus on technology instead of customers to drive innovation.  However both view points have value at probably different times in the R&D life-cycle.  In fact, managers need to balance investment between both approaches.

Clearly Intel believes in this approach – they have hired their on social scientists to design new computing solutions that could use their chips! The article has one good suggestion about deciding on customer impact that is quite useful in a B2B situation:

First, fully examine the impact your solution can have on a customer’s situation and how it can benefit them long-term. The only true measure of value is how your solution changes your customer’s net profit. Instruct your team in how to clearly and effectively relay such information, helping customers see your value from their own point of view–not in terms of industry averages, past experiences with other customers or generalizations, but in ways that will make them want to defend the validity of your solution to their own colleagues. That’s when you’ll know you’ve succeeded.

 Off to the races…


Improving quality of R&D portfolio management decisions

Yesterday, we discussed the need for an effective checklist in portfolio management and R&D decision making.  An article from Business Week Business Investment: Too Little, Too Late? describes what the checklist should cover:

  1. Surfacing biases in the decision process—Reveal and remove emotional and political factors that have impact on decisions.
  2. Systematically cataloging assumptions—Consistently capture presumptions that underlie decisions.
  3. Scoping options into investments—Assess the future potential moves or investments opened by near term decisions.
  4. Calculating Opportunity Cost of Decisions—Consider the value of the next best alternative forgone as the result of making a decision.
These four considerations are difficult to implement in an absolute sense.  For example, it is hardly ever possible to compute the opportunity cost of R&D project decisions – especially the early stage opportunities.  However, that does not mean that the managers should not consider opportunity costs.  A checklist is an effective solution here because it avoids the effort of actual computation while removing biases across managers that pure judgement calls might introduce.  This is especially true if one makes the choices in the checklist more objective: Instead of just asking portfolio reviewers to put in a score of 1 to 5, provide a brief description for each score.  We could always use the alternate discussion approach if there are significant differences across portfolio reviewers.
Please post a comment or email if you would like to see some examples…

R&D portfolio management best practices

Another article with some best practices for the weekend – this time from the Corporate Executive Board on R&D project portfolio management –Pick a Winner and Make it Pay.  As the pressure on improving R&D efficiency increases, one approach organizations seem to be following is increased portfolio reviews.

However, reviews do not automatically improve portfolio quality.  One of the key reasons for that is that projects need to be measured on equal terms across product lines, technologies, maturity, and divisions.  This is hard to do, but essential:

We saw the best portfolio managers focus on two capabilities in particular: 1. Ensuring project valuation and selection criteria are consistent across the enterprise. 2. Identifying and managing risk from the portfolio level down, rather than from the project level up. 

The other problem in reviews is lack of uniform categorization scheme (along three axes – product lines, technologies and maturities).  I have found that many large organizations have multiple parallel (often redundant) R&D projects.  Since the projects are not categorized in a consistent manner, it becomes extremely difficult for R&D managers to make effective decisions.

There are two practices that clients find particularly helpful in making the shift from a ‘project-up’ view to a ‘portfolio-down’ one. The first, that we came across in our current research, is from Deutsche Telekom and helps with the perennial problem of categorizing projects into the ‘kill’ or the ‘fund’ category. The firm’s T-Labs R&D group divides its portfolio into agreed zones to increase clarity of project scope and stimulate productive discussions on border line projects.

A systematic categorization allows organizations to aggregate data across projects and make strategic decisions at the portfolio level. Even when data is available, the portfolio decisions still need significant management intuition.  A problem tends to be that this intuition is not uniform across managers and it is often difficult to quantify it.  The article suggests voting as an approach:

The second is a client favorite from Ecolab , a cleaning services firm. Its R&D group developed a portfolio prioritization process that engages business leaders in the creation of high-growth R&D portfolios. Using an objective voting mechanism, senior managers rank proposed projects based on their potential ability to address the organization’s strategic objectives.

 I believe a more useful approach could be scoring based on a uniform / simple checklist.  A score for each project can calculated from the list.  In addition to quantifying manager intuition, these checklists allow organizations to learn from success / failure of funded projects.

I have a few examples that I could share.  Please send me an email.


What is Innovation?

In a HBR blog post, Scott Anthony asks What’s Stopping Innovation?  Of more interest is his attempt to define what is innovation:

When I use the word innovation, I think of three interlocking components:  

* Insight or inspiration suggesting an opportunity to do something different to create value 

* An idea or plan to build an offering based on that insight or inspiration 

* The translation of that plan into a successful business (in simple terms, commercialization) 

The senior leaders I talk to believe that the bulk of their innovation challenges lie in the first two components. I suspect this is because the third piece looks like execution, and of course, large organizations know all about execution. And yet, my field experience suggests that it’s this third component, not the first two, that actually blocks innovation

As we have noticed several times (Invention vs. Innovation, CEOs want more creativity, BCG Innovation Study and Ideation Tools), lack of clear innovation definition leads to many incorrect conclusions about how and when to drive innovation.  Furthermore, a unclear definition also leads to indeterminate metrics for innovation.  Without clear metrics, it becomes difficult to measure innovation.

The author is quite right about execution preventing realization of the benefits of innovation.  There have been many articles about open innovation and reverse innovation.  However, implementation of  innovation from outside the R&D organization (even a sister division of the same company) is fraught with not-invented-here problems.  R&D managers need to be quite clear in their plans on benefiting from access to outside innovation.

Another problem I have seen repeatedly is lack of funding for converting innovative ideas or plans into delivered products.  Many innovative ideas come from research arms of R&D organizations.  There is always a tension because of researcher ideas that might impact funding for or sales an existing product line.  In many cases, the innovative ideas suffer because of inherent risk and the clout of product managers.  What have you seen?


Are Companies Protecting the Wrong R&D Investments? – Scott Anthony – Harvard Business Review

An older HBR article talks about Are Companies Protecting the Wrong R&D Investments.

An article in Monday’s Wall Street Journal suggests that many executives understand this dynamic. The Journal found that R&D spending at 28 large U.S. companies dropped a mere 0.7 percent in the dismal fourth quarter of 2008.

Is maintenance of R&D budgets a good thing?  We have found a couple of examples (TI and FreeScale) that leveraged the downturn to eliminate low return R&D projects from the pipeline.  There is also some evidence that R&D spending does not automatically guarantee profits.  This article reinforces that theme – use downturn to evaluate and prune the R&D project pipeline, but do not focus exclusively on near-term projects because that will have a negative long-term impact on competitiveness.

Research by Innosight Board member Clark Gilbert found that when companies perceive a threat, they tend to become very rigid in their response. The very act of “protecting” R&D budgets could lead to high degrees of rigidity, which could lead companies to missing the most important innovation opportunities.

Companies should use today’s tough times as an excuse to critically evaluate their innovation investments. As I argue in Chapter 2 of The Silver Lining (coming next month!), companies need to think about prudently pruning their innovation efforts to focus on ideas with the most potential. Companies should seek to balance focus on near-in opportunities with appropriate investments in exploring new markets that have the potential to be tomorrow’s core business.

While we are on the subject, here is another article suggesting the same thing – Cut Costs, Grow Stronger:

“If you are a corporate leader, you have probably been spending a lot of time lately thinking about costs. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008–09, the pressure to cut costs — whether driven by cash flow, shareholders, uncertainty, or investment needs — has been extraordinary. Many businesses are struggling to survive. Others, even if they’re doing relatively well, are reducing expenses to make sure they are well prepared for future uncertainties. But there is a positive side to this situation. Dramatic cost cutting gives you a chance to refine or even reformulate your company’s overall strategy. After all, you’re never just cutting costs. You’re making a decision that something is no longer strategically relevant, and that other things are essential to keep. Yes, you may have to lose some product lines and activities, and perhaps some of your employees and customers. You also, however, have the opportunity to help your company grow stronger in the process. We reject the idea that cutting costs in itself makes a business weaker or more limited. To be sure, if you reduce expenses in a panic, or without an eye to strat egy, you could do great harm to your company’s competitiveness. But if you focus on your priorities and on your future potential, cutting costs can be a catalyst for ex actly the change a company needs. 

Finally, here is a simple framework that can be a good reminder of what to keep and what to cut:


Rewarding Failure

The Kellogg Insights from Kellogg School of Business has an article justifying Bonuses Despite Billion Dollar Bailouts:

Eisfeldt and Rampini’s research suggests that their function is less about the past than the future. Bonuses provide managers with an incentive to be honest about their own performance and about the firm’s prospects earlier rather than later, when shifting capital to more productive managers and more productive uses can have the greatest impact.

Clearly, large bonuses in failing financial institutions is a touchy subject and I would like to stay away from it.  However, there is definitely a case for rewarding failure in R&D.  If all R&D efforts are successful, than the organization is not taking large enough risks and would likely not be able to compete long-term.  Managers need to drive a healthy risk appetite, while managing overall exposure.  Furthermore, if failures are not exposed early, more money is normally wasted in keeping wasteful projects alive.  It also means that the R&D culture is not accepting of failure and that is a dangerous path.

One effective approach to encouraging/managing risk is to tie some fraction of executive compensation to “Wasted Development Effort.”  The idea here is to recognize that some R&D should fail and that the executives should be encouraged to talk about it.  If the term wasted development effort does not sound appropriate, consider Technology Path Elimination.  My boss a few years ago came up with this term and it sounds much better: Encouraging R&D organizations to eliminate technology paths that will eventually lead to failure.  Thoughts?


Disruptive and sustaining innovation

Inder Sandhu, SVP of Strategy and Planning at Cisco has written an article in Forbes about new product platform development and product improvement.  The idea is that an organization needs to focus on developing new product platforms while generating revenues from incremental improvements to existing platforms.  He calls it Disruptive and Sustaining Innovation.

But doing both isn’t easy. Start-ups often prefer the dogged pursuit of the next big idea. And large companies are often reluctant to invest in disruptive innovation, feeling constricted by their commitments to existing customers, pressure from investors for short-term results or even fear of upsetting existing revenue streams.

But when companies do both, the payoff can be great. Two complementary options, in this case sustaining and disruptive innovation, can amplify one another many times over. When Cisco makes an advance in one form of innovation, it usually gains a benefit in the other. And that is the true power of doing both.

Clearly, author has a great point and R&D managers need to effectively balance R&D investments across disruptive and sustaining projects.  There are also other axes that  factor in: Early stage or mature, discriminating vs sustaining, skill-set enhancing vs. feature developing etc. However, the right balance is often difficult to find and tools to visualize and effectively guide the R&D portfolio are nonexistent.

I am not sure if I would necessarily call adding features to an existing product innovation.  However, definition of innovation it self is some what confusing.  Clearly, one can make disruptive innovations in production of an existing product and there by gaining a new advantage in the market place (see the earlier post about R&D at 3M).  However, calling all R&D innovation may hinder effective R&D portfolio balancing.

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